Much of the study of language has centered around the study of syntax, to the detriment of semantics and pragmatics. Part of the reason for this may be akin to the motivation of the besotted gentleman on his hands and knees beneath a streetlamp, who, when queried as to why he is looking on the sidewalk for the keys he lost in the alley, replies: "Because the light is better here!" I believe it is time to start mucking about in the alley; the keys are there. I also think we have a new flashlight: Parallel Distributed Processing 2. PDP mechanisms allow us to build machines whose fundamental operations include best fit search, constraint relaxation and automatic generalization. These are useful properties for processing language. I think the application of these models to NLP will change our view of what constitutes "semantics'. I will argue that in order to deal with meaning seriously, we have to move beyond the folkpsychological level of symbols, and represent the microstructure of symbols. This is more than a granularity issue. It also has to do with the grounding of meaning in perception. It is on the level of microfeatures that I believe this grounding occurs, and PDP gives us a way to express this interface between language and perception.
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My discussion of these issues will take the following course 3. First I describe my previous work on word sense disambiguation in a PDP framework as a springboard for the rest of the discussion, and to give a sense of how lexical semantics might fit into an overall parsing model. Next I motivate a new model of word meanings through an example. I try to show that PDP has a natural way of expressing these meanings, and I give a sketch of how connectionist semantics could be learned. Finally, I briefly discuss metaphor.
Word sense dlsamblguatlon
One of the fundamental problems of natural language processing is word sense disambiguation. Determining the correct sense of a word for a particular use involves the interaction of many sources of knowledge: syntactic, semantic and pragmatic (i.e., "everything else'). In previous work (Cottrell, 1985) I have shown how word sense disambiguation can be modeled as a constraint relaxation process between competing hypotheses instantiated as nodes in a network representing linguistic knowledge. The representation is one that I have fancifully called proclarative: disambiguation happens as the result of activation spreading through a knowledge base where constraints between hypotheses are represented by positive and negative links between them. Figure 1 shows the bas/c structure of the model. The model operates as follows: First, words activate all of their lexical entries. These, in turn, activate syntactic and semantic (case) structures, which represent relations between word senses. It is feedback from these developing representations that provides support for the correct meanings and syntactic classes of the words. At the same time, bindings of constituents to roles in both syntax and semantics are mutually constraining one another to decide such things as prepositional phrase attachment. Thus parsing into a case structure is modeled as a three way constraint relaxation between the lexical entries of the words, the possible syntactic representations, and the possible semantic relations. Syntactic and semantic information are accessed in parallel, and operate s/multancously to determine the correct parse. This was I would like to thank Mike Mozer, Harold Pashler, and Dave Rumelhart for helpful comments on this paper. Any haziness that remains is mine.
2[ will resume familiarity with the coonectionist, or PDP paradigm. The best introduction is Rumelhart and McCleUand (1986) . shown to be a useful model of the human disambiguation process, as evidenced by explanations of various psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic results.
One of the major weaknesses of that model was the representation of "meaning'. Each meaning of a word is represented by a unit with an "awkward lexeme" (WilLs, 1976) as a label. Certainly, the label on a node is not important; it is the way the node connects up to other nodes that determine its relationship to other "meanings'. But I think this is a general failing of almost all NLP programs currently in existence: the meaning of a word is best represented not as a symbol, but as an aggregate of connected mlcrofeatures. I will next try to show why.
What Is meaning? (A thought experiment)
It has been said that all words are polys~nous to a degree. Let's take a fairly sale example: truck. This seems hardly polysemous, but it turns out we can bend the meaning, at least the image formed, in fairly continuous ways. Consider Billy picked up the truck. If you are like me, you get a picture of a small, probably pl~tic truck. In a symbolic system we might have a rule that if a usually large object is the obiect of a picking up action, then we should "toy-iCy" it, either looking up the entry for "toy truck" or by apply/ng a "toy/fication" transformation to the repres~tation we had already retrieved: it weighs less, it is much smaller, it is composed of plastic. Of course, in S,,perman picked up the truck, we have an exception to the rule. And in Bobby picked up the roy gun, the application of the toy-ify/ng rule would need to be modified so that the size is not reduced. One can imagine that the list of rules and their application criteria might get a bit unwieldy.
One answer to this is, "Yes, the world is compL(cated." The problem is that this is not an isolated phenomenon. Rather, it pervades our conceptual landscape. The concepts that people use are not fixed entities, nor are they entities that vary discretely along a small number of dimensions. They covary in a continuous way. In Tommy lugged the truck up dze hill, we imagine a heavier toy truck than the one Billy picked up, but a lighter one than Superman did. It might even be the same truck -Billy picked up the truck and handed it to Tommy. Tommy lugged it up the hill." In this case it is Tommy that we imagine is smaller than Billy! Thus the interpretation we derive of the words in a sentence is the result of constraints between the meanings of the individual words, as well as the usual list: the structure of the sentence, the context in which it is spoken, the relationship between the speaker and the hearer, the shared knowledge, etc. People are very good at tasks like this that involve the application of multiple, simultaneous constraints. I claim that the "rules" that I attempted to describe above can emerge from the regularities of interaction among the internal structures of the concepts themselvea, rather than an application of explicit rules to atomic concepts 4. There is no reason that this could not be implemented in a "symbolic" system that has a constraint propagation mechanism, and continuous-valued levels of properties. The problem is that the modification would alter it so radically that we might as well have started with a conneetionist model s.
4I am not claiming these arc simply first order interactions; relations b©twccn fcatu~ ¢lu~m also need to be captured.
5Another reason for starting with a conncctionist model is the existence of powerful learning algorithms that can derive constraints between features, as we will son bc/ow.
A modest proposal
In this section I will draw on previous work of others to lay out how a connectionlst model can represent the kind of meanings that I think our experiment with truck point to. The basic idea is that meanings arc connectionist schemata. These are assumed to be embedded in a system like the one I described above for word sense disamblguation -that is, they arc getting input from other schemata concerned with syntax and larger semantic (case) structures. (The weights were set according to the conditions] probability that one item was reported given another item was reported.) Things that occurred together often were given a strong positive weight, things that never occurred together were given a negative weight. For exzmple, every room has walls and a ceiling. These have a strong positive connection between them because they always co-occur. Probing the model consists of "clamping on" some units, which then activate positively connected units, and inhibit ones negatively associated with them. The office schema, for example, can be accessed by probing the model with "desk" (and "ceiling', to simulate the context is "room') (se¢ Figure 2) . The "prototype" rooms are shown to be peaks in a "goodness surface" in the space of unit activations that reflects the number of constraints satisfied between units of the model. The activation of the units travels up the goodness surface to the corner where the elements of the office schema become activated. This type of pattern completion is a typical way to access information in connectionist models. sound and light (see Figure 5 ) ~. Now it will only take one of the input modalities to evoke the other. The input of an image would activate the image encoding, which in turn would partially activate the unif.,'xl encoding of associated sounds and images. This can be filled out by pattern completion, enabling the unified encoding to feed back and activate the encoding of the word associated with the image. That is, an image will evoke a word and a word an image. WhiIe this is an oversimplified sketch, the important point is that conneetionist systems use a uniform representation medium for both modalities, and thus afford the modeler an ease of communication between visual, proprloceptive and auditory inputs. Thus, this approach promises a computationally viable way to ground the infinite regress of meaning in associations between speech sounds with other perceptual representations generated from interactions with the environment While this is just the base case of the induction, it has not been addressed by other approaches. on the output layer, we can now give the network (F a *) (where " represents no input) and it will produce F(a,b), computing that F(a) equals b. In fact, within resource limitations, we can give it F(*,b) or even "(a,b) and have it invert the mapping or induce the relationship between the arguments. In ambiguous cases it will produce blends of the possible answers.
Conneetionlst

An interesting variation on. this is when two items arc probed together that do not normally co-occur. For example, if the model is probed with "bed" and "sofa" what rcsults is
Now, assume that we have enough units in the argument positions that we can represent anything we want, and that we have trained it with functions and arguments from several disparate domains. Suppose we now give the network a function F with an argument c that is not in the domain of F. One characteristic of these networks is that they map similar inputs to similar outputs. The degree of overlap between the features of c and the features of elements of the domain of F will determine the coherency of the mapping. If c is sufficiently similar to a previously learned input, it will map c to an output similar to the previous one. It is able to do this because the mapping reflects constraints it has learned between the features of the inputs and outputs of F. If c is sufficiently different from other inputs it has learned in the domain of F, the result will be uninterpretable. Somewhere between these two is metaphor s .
Conclusion
I have attempted to show in this paper that word meanings are more of a moving target than we would like to think, and that they covary depending on constraints between them. The connectionist approach to semantics has a natural way to capture these smoothly varying constraints and meanings. I also have sketched how these meanings can be grounded in perceptual encoding; and how some aspects of metaphor might be captured in this framework.
